Dynamic conformance and design quality in a supply chain: an assessment of contracts' coordinating power

被引:84
作者
El Ouardighi, Fouad [1 ]
Kogan, Konstantin [2 ]
机构
[1] ESSEC Business Sch, Operat Management Dept, F-95021 Cergy Pontoise, France
[2] Bar Ilan Univ, Dept Management, Fac Social Sci, IL-52900 Ramat Gan, Israel
关键词
Design quality; Conformance quality; Supply chain coordination; Dynamic games; REVENUE-SHARING CONTRACTS; COMPETITION;
D O I
10.1007/s10479-013-1414-4
中图分类号
C93 [管理学]; O22 [运筹学];
学科分类号
070105 ; 12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
We consider a two-echelon supply chain involving one manufacturer and one supplier who collaborate on improving both design and conformance quality. Design quality is supposed to increase product desirability, and therefore market demand, while conformance quality should reduce the proportion of defective items, and therefore increase the manufacturer's sales revenue. We investigate how the supply chain parties allocate effort between design and conformance quality under both cooperative and non-cooperative settings in an intertemporal framework. Furthermore, we evaluate wholesale price contracts and revenue-sharing contracts in terms of their performance and coordination power. We show that although a revenue-sharing contract enables the manufacturer to effectively involve the supplier in quality improvement, neither contract type allows for perfect coordination resulting in the quality that can be achieved by a cooperative supply chain. We thus suggest a reward-based extension to the revenue-sharing contract, to ensure system-wide optimal quality performance. Importantly, we find that the supplier would be better off adopting a reward-based revenue sharing contract and refusing a standard revenue-sharing contract, while the opposite would be true for the manufacturer.
引用
收藏
页码:137 / 166
页数:30
相关论文
共 20 条
[1]  
[Anonymous], 2003, HDB OPERATIONS RES M
[2]  
[Anonymous], 2000, DIFFERENTIAL GAMES E
[3]   DEALER AND MANUFACTURER MARGINS [J].
BRESNAHAN, TF ;
REISS, PC .
RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1985, 16 (02) :253-268
[4]   Supply chain coordination with revenue-sharing contracts: Strengths and limitations [J].
Cachon, GP ;
Lariviere, MA .
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, 2005, 51 (01) :30-44
[5]   Capacity allocation for dynamic process improvement with quality and demand considerations [J].
Chand, S ;
Moskowitz, H ;
Novak, A ;
Rekhi, I ;
Sorger, G .
OPERATIONS RESEARCH, 1996, 44 (06) :964-975
[6]  
Dana JD, 2001, J IND ECON, V49, P223
[7]   Quality choice and vertical integration [J].
Economides, N .
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, 1999, 17 (06) :903-914
[8]   A dynamic game with monopolist manufacturer and price-competing duopolist retailers [J].
El Ouardighi, Fouad ;
Jorgensen, Steffen ;
Pasin, Federico .
OR SPECTRUM, 2013, 35 (04) :1059-1084
[9]   A DYNAMIC GAME OF OPERATIONS AND MARKETING MANAGEMENT IN A SUPPLY CHAIN [J].
El Ouardighi, Fouad ;
Jorgensen, Steffen ;
Pasin, Federico .
INTERNATIONAL GAME THEORY REVIEW, 2008, 10 (04) :373-397
[10]   Supply quality management with wholesale price and revenue-sharing contracts under horizontal competition [J].
El Ouardighi, Fouad ;
Kim, Bowon .
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF OPERATIONAL RESEARCH, 2010, 206 (02) :329-340