The Virtues of Gossip: Reputational Information Sharing as Prosocial Behavior

被引:255
作者
Feinberg, Matthew [1 ]
Willer, Robb [2 ]
Stellar, Jennifer [1 ]
Keltner, Dacher [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Calif Berkeley, Dept Psychol, Berkeley, CA 94720 USA
[2] Univ Calif Berkeley, Dept Sociol, Berkeley, CA 94720 USA
关键词
gossip; prosocial behavior; reputation systems; cooperation; social dilemmas; SOCIAL VALUE ORIENTATION; COMPETITIVE ALTRUISM; EVOLUTIONARY PERSPECTIVE; INDIRECT RECIPROCITY; EXPERIMENTAL GAMES; DECISION-MAKING; HUMAN AMYGDALA; COOPERATION; DILEMMAS; HUMANS;
D O I
10.1037/a0026650
中图分类号
B84 [心理学];
学科分类号
04 ; 0402 ;
摘要
Reputation systems promote cooperation and deter antisocial behavior in groups. Little is known, however, about how and why people share reputational information. Here, we seek to establish the existence and dynamics of prosocial gossip, the sharing of negative evaluative information about a target in a way that protects others from antisocial or exploitative behavior. We present a model of prosocial gossip and the results of 4 studies testing the model's claims. Results of Studies 1 through 3 demonstrate that (a) individuals who observe an antisocial act experience negative affect and are compelled to share information about the antisocial actor with a potentially vulnerable person, (b) sharing such information reduces negative affect created by observing the antisocial behavior, and (c) individuals possessing more prosocial orientations are the most motivated to engage in such gossip, even at a personal cost, and exhibit the greatest reduction in negative affect as a result. Study 4 demonstrates that prosocial gossip can effectively deter selfishness and promote cooperation. Taken together these results highlight the roles of prosocial motivations and negative affective reactions to injustice in maintaining reputational information sharing in groups. We conclude by discussing implications for reputational theories of the maintenance of cooperation in human groups.
引用
收藏
页码:1015 / 1030
页数:16
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