A transaction cost primer on farm organization

被引:8
作者
Allen, DW [1 ]
Lueck, D
机构
[1] Simon Fraser Univ, Vancouver, BC, Canada
[2] Montana State Univ, Bozeman, MT 59717 USA
来源
CANADIAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS-REVUE CANADIENNE D AGROECONOMIE | 2000年 / 48卷 / 04期
关键词
D O I
10.1111/j.1744-7976.2000.tb00418.x
中图分类号
F3 [农业经济];
学科分类号
0202 ; 020205 ; 1203 ;
摘要
Agricultural economists, with their knowledge of farming, are well positioned to take advantage of the fertile ground of economic organization. The transaction cost paradigm is particularly useful in addressing such questions and is outlined in this paper. The overriding theme in the transaction cost approach is that patterns of ownership and contracts are chosen to mitigate transaction costs, which result from attempts to establish and maintain property rights. In agriculture, transaction costs are heavily influenced by Mother Nature. Nature's uncertainty, via weather and pests, leads to moral hazard and seasonal forces impose constraints on production cycles that are not often found in the production of most other commodities. Applications in land contracts, asset control, and business organization are discussed.
引用
收藏
页码:643 / 652
页数:10
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