Bank interest margins and business start-up collateral: Testing for convexity

被引:12
作者
Burke, A [1 ]
Hanley, A
机构
[1] Cranfield Univ, Cranfield MK43 0AL, Beds, England
[2] Univ Nottingham, Nottingham NG7 2RD, England
关键词
asymmetric information; bank lending; credit constraints;
D O I
10.1111/j.1467-9485.2006.00382.x
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The paper investigates the relationship between bank interest rate margins and collateral for loans issued to new ventures. The analysis finds a convex U-shaped relationship. The results indicate that while provision of collateral initially reduces bank exposure to risk (through security, more optimal levels of capital and lower moral hazard among entrepreneurs) that beyond a point, the positive risk-wealth association gives rise to greater risk taking propensity among entrepreneurs and ultimately higher interest rates. This indicates that a lender's pricing policy may even somewhat help to level the competitive playing field between ventures launched by higher and moderately wealthy entrepreneurs.
引用
收藏
页码:319 / 334
页数:16
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