Supply-side risk adjustment and outlier payment policy

被引：12

作者：

Mougeot, Michel ^{[1
,2
]}

Naegelen, Florence ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Franche Comte, CRESE, UFR SJEPG, F-25030 Besancon, France

[2] Univ Lausanne, IEMS, Lausanne, Switzerland

来源：

JOURNAL OF HEALTH ECONOMICS | 2008年 / 27卷 / 05期

关键词：

hospital; risk; outlier payment; moral hazard;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jhealeco.2008.05.007

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

In most health care systems where a prospective payment system is implemented, an outlier payment is used to cover the hospitals' unusually high costs. When the hospital chooses its cost reduction effort before observing a patient's severity, we show that the best outlier payment is based on the realized cost when the hospital exerts the first best level of effort, for any level of severity. (c) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：1196 / 1200

页数：5

共 11 条

[1]

Bolton P., 2005, Contract theory

[2] INSURANCE PRINCIPLES AND THE DESIGN OF PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT SYSTEMS [J].

ELLIS, RP ;

MCGUIRE, TG .

JOURNAL OF HEALTH ECONOMICS, 1988, 7 (03) :215-237

[3]

KAWASAKI S, 1987, J JAPANESE INT EC, V1, P327, DOI DOI 10.1016/0889-1583(87)90014-1

[4] INSURANCE ASPECTS OF DRG OUTLIER PAYMENTS [J].

KEELER, EB ;

CARTER, GM ;

TRUDE, S .

JOURNAL OF HEALTH ECONOMICS, 1988, 7 (03) :193-214

[5] Regulation of a risk averse firm [J].

Laffont, JJ ;

Rochet, JC .

GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 1998, 25 (02) :149-173

[6]

McClellan M, 1997, J ECON MANAGE STRAT, V6, P91

[7] The theory of moral hazard and unobservable behaviour: Part I [J].

Mirrlees, JA .

REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1999, 66 (01) :3-21

[8]

MOUGEOT M, 2008, J RISH INSU IN PRESS

[9]

Newhouse Joseph P., 2002, Pricing the Priceless: A Health Care Conundrum

[10] Using subjective risk adjusting to prevent patient dumping in the health care industry [J].

Sappington, DEM ;

Lewis, TR .

JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY, 1999, 8 (03) :351-382

← 1 2 →