Regulation of a risk averse firm

被引：42

作者：

Laffont, JJ ^{[1
]}

Rochet, JC ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Toulouse 1, IDEI, GREMAQ, Inst Univ France, F-31042 Toulouse, France

来源：

GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 1998年 / 25卷 / 02期

关键词：

regulation; risk; bunching; cost-plus contracts;

D O I：

10.1006/game.1998.0639

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We extend the Laffont-Tirole regulation model to the case of risk-averse firms. Our main results are: 1. The impact of risk aversion is to shift the optimal contract toward a cost-plus contract. 2. As compared with the risk-neutral case, distortions are greater and informational rents are smaller. 3. For high levels of risk aversion, the optimal contract involves cost ceilings and the less efficient firms are bunched together. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D8, L5. (C) 1998 Academic Press.

引用

页码：149 / 173

页数：25

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