Climate change - All in the game

被引:30
作者
Pfeiffer, T [1 ]
Nowak, MA
机构
[1] Harvard Univ, Dept Organism & Evolutionary Biol, Program Evolutionary Dynam, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[2] Harvard Univ, Dept Math, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1038/441583a
中图分类号
O [数理科学和化学]; P [天文学、地球科学]; Q [生物科学]; N [自然科学总论];
学科分类号
07 ; 0710 ; 09 ;
摘要
It is in the public interest to keep Earth's climate on an even keel — the public, in this case, being all the world's population. Are you prepared to stake your own reputation on helping to improve matters?
引用
收藏
页码:583 / 584
页数:2
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