Dynamics of conformist bias

被引：22

作者：

Skyrms, B ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Calif Irvine, Dept Log & Philosophy Sci, Irvine, CA 92697 USA

来源：

MONIST | 2005年 / 88卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.5840/monist200588213

中图分类号：

B [哲学、宗教];

学科分类号：

01 ; 0101 ;

摘要：

We compare replicator dynamics for some simple games with and without the addition of conformist bias. The addition of conformist bias can create equilibria, it can change the stability properties of existing equilibria, it may leave the equilibrium structure intact but change the relative size of basins of attraction, or it may do nothing at all. Examples of each of the foregoing are given.

引用

页码：260 / 269

页数：10

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