The simple analytics of information and experimentation in dynamic agency

被引：14

作者：

Jeitschko, TD ^{[1
]}

Mirman, LJ

Salgueiro, E

机构：

[1] Michigan State Univ, Dept Econ, E Lansing, MI 48824 USA

[2] Univ Virginia, Dept Econ, Charlottesville, VA 22903 USA

[3] Univ Aveiro, SAGEI, P-3810 Aveiro, Portugal

来源：

ECONOMIC THEORY | 2002年 / 19卷 / 03期

关键词：

Bayesian learning; experimentation; dynamic agency; ratchet effect; regulation; procurement;

D O I：

10.1007/s001990000156

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

The dynamics of a stochastic, two-period principal-agent relationship is studied. The agent's type remains the same over time. Contracts are short term. The principal designs the second contract, taking the information available about the agent after the first period into account. Compared to deterministic environments significant changes emerge: First, fully separating contracts are optimal. Second, the principal has two opposing incentives when designing contracts: the principal 'experiments,' making signals more informative; yet dampens signals, thereby reducing up-front payments. As a result, 'good' agents' targets are ratcheted over time.

引用

页码：549 / 570

页数：22

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