A note on three-player noncooperative bargaining with restricted pairwise meetings

被引：9

作者：

Calvó-Armengol, A

机构：

[1] Univ Pompeu Fabra, Dept Econ, Barcelona, Spain

[2] ENPC, CERAS, F-75007 Paris, France

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 1999年 / 65卷 / 01期

关键词：

bargaining; central player; peripheral players; impatience rates;

D O I：

10.1016/S0165-1765(99)00136-6

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

A three-player bargaining game where only the central player can negotiate with two different partners has a unique perfect equilibrium outcome. We discuss when the a priori favored position of the central player is really advantageous in terms of equilibrium payoffs. (C) 1999 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.

引用

收藏

页码：47 / 54

页数：8

相关论文

共 12 条

[1] AN N-PERSON PURE BARGAINING GAME [J].

CHAE, S ;

YANG, JA .

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1994, 62 (01) :86-102

[2] NONCOOPERATIVE BARGAINING OF N-GREATER-THAN-OR-EQUAL-TO-3 PLAYERS [J].

HALLER, H .

ECONOMICS LETTERS, 1986, 22 (01) :11-13

[3] SEQUENTIAL BARGAINING IN A MARKET WITH ONE SELLER AND 2 DIFFERENT BUYERS [J].

HENDON, E ;

TRANAES, T .

GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 1991, 3 (04) :453-466

[4]

HERRERO M, 1985, THESIS U LONDON

[5] WORKER SUBSTITUTABILITY AND PATTERNS OF UNIONIZATION [J].

HORN, H ;

WOLINSKY, A .

ECONOMIC JOURNAL, 1988, 98 (391) :484-497

[6] A strategic model of social and economic networks [J].

Jackson, MO ;

Wolinsky, A .

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1996, 71 (01) :44-74

[7] CYCLICAL DELAY IN BARGAINING WITH EXTERNALITIES [J].

JEHIEL, P ;

MOLDOVANU, B .

REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1995, 62 (04) :619-637

[8]

Myerson R. B., 1977, Mathematics of Operations Research, V2, P225, DOI 10.1287/moor.2.3.225

[9] PERFECT EQUILIBRIUM IN A BARGAINING MODEL [J].

RUBINSTEIN, A .

ECONOMETRICA, 1982, 50 (01) :97-109

[10] INVOLUNTARY UNEMPLOYMENT AS A PERFECT EQUILIBRIUM IN A BARGAINING MODEL [J].

SHAKED, A ;

SUTTON, J .

ECONOMETRICA, 1984, 52 (06) :1351-1364