共 18 条
Sequential equilibria in a Ramsey tax model
被引:78
作者:
Phelan, C
Stacchetti, E
机构:
[1] Research Dept, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
[2] Dept. of Economics, University of Michigan
关键词:
capital taxation;
government credibility;
time consistent government policy;
recursive methods;
D O I:
10.1111/1468-0262.00255
中图分类号:
F [经济];
学科分类号:
02 ;
摘要:
This paper presents a full characterization of the equilibrium value set of a Ramsey tax model. More generally, it develops a dynamic programming method for a class of policy games between the government and a continuum of households. By selectively incorporating Euler conditions into a strategic dynamic programming framework, we wed two technologies that are usually considered competing alternatives, resulting in a substantial simplification of the problem.
引用
收藏
页码:1491 / 1518
页数:28
相关论文