Clocks and Trees: Isomorphic Dutch Auctions and Centipede Games

被引:15
作者
Cox, James C. [1 ,2 ]
James, Duncan [3 ]
机构
[1] Georgia State Univ, Andrew Young Sch Policy Studies, Expt Econ Ctr ExCEN, Atlanta, GA 30302 USA
[2] Georgia State Univ, Andrew Young Sch Policy Studies, Dept Econ, Atlanta, GA 30302 USA
[3] Fordham Univ, Dept Econ, Bronx, NY 10458 USA
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
Experiment; game theory; centipede games; Dutch auctions; institutional format; dynamic structure; EQUILIBRIUM; TIME;
D O I
10.3982/ECTA9589
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We report an experiment on effects of varying institutional format and dynamic structure of centipede games and Dutch auctions. Centipede games with a clock format unravel, as predicted by theory but not reported in previous literature on two-player tree-format centipede games. Dutch auctions with a tree format produce bids close to risk neutral Nash equilibrium bids, unlike previous literature on clock-format Dutch auctions. Our data provide a new, expanded set of stylized facts which may provide a foundation for unified modeling of play in a class of games that includes centipede games and Dutch auctions.
引用
收藏
页码:883 / 903
页数:21
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