On the evolution of attitudes towards risk in winner-take-all games

被引：64

作者：

Dekel, E ^{[1
]}

Scotchmer, S

机构：

[1] Northwestern Univ, Dept Econ, Evanston, IL 60201 USA

[2] Tel Aviv Univ, IL-69978 Tel Aviv, Israel

[3] Univ Calif Berkeley, GSPP, Berkeley, CA 94720 USA

[4] Univ Calif Berkeley, Dept Econ, Berkeley, CA 94720 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 1999年 / 87卷 / 01期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

D O I：

10.1006/jeth.1999.2537

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

A long-standing conjecture is that winner-take-all games such as patent races lead to the survival of risk-takers and the extinction of risk-averters. In many species a winner-lake-ail game determines the males' right to reproduce, and the same argument suggests that males will evolve to he risk-takers. Psychological and sociological evidence buttresses the argument that males are more risk-taking than females. Using an evolutionary model of preference-formation, we investigate to what extent evolution leads to risk-taking in winner-take-ail environments. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C7, D8. (C) 1999 Academic Press.

引用

页码：125 / 143

页数：19

共 34 条

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[Anonymous], 1978, J Soc Biol Struct

[2] RISK-TAKING - A MOTIVATIONAL BASIS FOR SEX-DIFFERENCES [J].