The importance of IRS monitoring to debt pricing in private firms

被引:125
作者
Guedhami, Omrane [1 ,2 ]
Pittman, Jeffrey [1 ]
机构
[1] Mem Univ Newfoundland, St John, NF A1B 3X5, Canada
[2] Univ S Carolina, Moore Sch Business, Columbia, SC 29208 USA
关键词
Corporate governance; Taxes; Agency costs of debt; Ownership Structure;
D O I
10.1016/j.jfineco.2007.12.002
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We examine the link between Internal Revenue Service (IRS) monitoring and yield spreads on private firms' 144A bond issues. After controlling for security-specific and other firm-specific determinants, we provide evidence that debt financing is cheaper when the probability of a face-to-face IRS audit is higher. Consistent with another prediction, we find that IRS oversight has a stronger impact on bond pricing for private firms with high ownership concentration, which suffer worse agency problems between controlling shareholders and outside investors. Collectively, our research implies that IRS monitoring plays a valuable corporate governance role by reducing information asymmetry evident in borrowing costs. (c) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:38 / 58
页数:21
相关论文
共 65 条