Unifying Moral Methodology

被引:8
作者
Mcpherson, Tristram [1 ]
机构
[1] Virginia Tech, Dept Philosophy, Blacksburg, VA 24061 USA
关键词
ETHICS;
D O I
10.1111/j.1468-0114.2012.01437.x
中图分类号
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要
This article argues that the best way to pursue systematic normative ethical theorizing involves metaethical enquiry. My argument builds upon two central claims. First, I argue that plausible metaethical accounts can have implications that can help to resolve the methodological controversies facing normative ethics. Second, I argue that metaethical research is at least roughly as well supported as normative ethical research. I conclude by examining the implications of my thesis. Inter alia, it shows that the common practice of engaging in systematic normative theorizing uninformed by metaethical commitments offers a significant and troubling hostage to metaethical fortune.
引用
收藏
页码:523 / 549
页数:27
相关论文
共 63 条
[11]  
Boyd Richard., 1997, MORAL DISCOURSE PRAC, P105
[12]  
Copp D., 2012, Oxford studies in metaethics, P1
[13]  
Copp David., 1985, MORALITY REASON TRUT, P141
[14]  
DANCY J, 1985, PAC PHILOS QUART, V66, P141
[15]   WIDE REFLECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM AND THEORY ACCEPTANCE IN ETHICS [J].
DANIELS, N .
JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, 1979, 76 (05) :256-282
[16]  
DePaul Michael., 1998, RETHINKING INTUITION
[17]  
Doris John., 2006, OXFORD HDB CONT ANAL, P114
[18]   Objectivity and truth: You'd better believe it [J].
Dworkin, R .
PHILOSOPHY & PUBLIC AFFAIRS, 1996, 25 (02) :87-139
[19]  
Dworkin Ronald., 1988, LAWS EMPIRE
[20]  
Enoch David., 2007, OXFORD STUDIES METAE, V2, P21