School choice:: an experimental study

被引：171

作者：

Chen, Y

Sönmez, T

机构：

[1] Univ Michigan, Sch Informat, Ann Arbor, MI 48109 USA

[2] Koc Univ, Dept Econ, TR-34450 Istanbul, Turkey

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 2006年 / 127卷 / 01期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

school choice; experiment; matching; Gale-Shapley; top trading cycles; Boston mechanism;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jet.2004.10.006

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We present an experimental study of three school choice mechanisms. The Boston mechanism is influential in practice, while the Gale-Shapley and Top Trading Cycles mechanisms have superior theoretical properties. Consistent with theory, this study indicates a high preference manipulation rate under Boston. As a result, efficiency under Boston is significantly lower than that of the two competing mechanisms in the designed environment. However, contrary to theory, Gale-Shapley outperforms Top Trading Cycles and generates the highest efficiency. Our results suggest that replacing the Boston mechanism with either Gale-Shapley or Top Trading Cycles mechanism might significantly improve efficiency. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：202 / 231

页数：30

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