Conflict and distribution

被引：248

作者：

Esteban, J ^{[1
]}

Ray, D

机构：

[1] CSIC, Inst Anal Econ, Barcelona 08193, Spain

[2] Boston Univ, Dept Econ, Boston, MA 02215 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 1999年 / 87卷 / 02期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

conflict; inequality; polarization; rent-seeking;

D O I：

10.1006/jeth.1999.2549

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We develop a behavioral model that links the level and pattern of social conflict to the societywide distribution of individual characteristics. The model can be applied to groups that differ in characteristics such as wealth, ethnicity, religion, and political ideology. We settle questions of existence and uniqueness of conflict equilibrium. Conflict is seen to be closely connected with the bimodality of the underlying distribution of characteristics. However, in general, the conflict-distribution relationship is nonlinear and surprisingly complex. Our results on conflict patterns also throw light on the phenomena of extremism and moderation. (C) 1999 Academic Press.

引用

页码：379 / 415

页数：37

共 28 条

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