Coalitional bargaining with competition to make offers

被引：32

作者：

Evans, R

机构：

[1] St. John's College, Cambridge University, Cambridge

来源：

GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 1997年 / 19卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1006/game.1997.0553

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

The paper analyzes a simple discrete-time noncooperative coalitional bargaining game in which, at each stage, there is a contest for the right to make a proposal. The pure stationary subgame-perfect equilibrium payoff set is equal to the core. (C) 1997 Academic Press.

引用

页码：211 / 220

页数：10

共 8 条

[1] A NONCOOPERATIVE THEORY OF COALITIONAL BARGAINING [J].