Cycling of simple rules in the spatial model

被引:7
作者
Austen-Smith, D [1 ]
Banks, JS
机构
[1] Northwestern Univ, Dept Polit Sci, Evanston, IL 60208 USA
[2] CALTECH, Div Humanities & Social Sci, Pasadena, CA 91125 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1007/s003550050167
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
McKelvey [4] proved that for strong simple preference aggregation rules applied to multidimensional sets of alternatives, the typical situation is that either the core is nonempty or the top-cycle set includes all available alternatives. But the requirement that the rule be strong excludes, inter alia, all supermajority rules. In this note, we show that McKelvey's theorem further implies that the typical situation for any simple rule is that either the core is nonempty or the weak top-cycle set (equivalently, the core of the transitive closure of the rule) includes all available alternatives. Moreover, it is often the case that both of these statements obtain.
引用
收藏
页码:663 / 672
页数:10
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