CEO compensation, family control, and institutional investors in Continental Europe

被引：106

作者：

Croci, Ettore ^{[1
]}

Gonenc, Halit ^{[2
]}

Ozkan, Neslihan ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Cattolica Sacro Cuore, I-20123 Milan, Italy

[2] Univ Groningen, Fac Econ & Business, NL-9700 AV Groningen, Netherlands

[3] Univ Bristol, Sch Econ Finance & Management, Bristol BS8 1TN, Avon, England

来源：

JOURNAL OF BANKING & FINANCE | 2012年 / 36卷 / 12期

关键词：

CEO compensation; Family firms; Institutional investors; Europe; EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM; FIRM; OWNERSHIP; PERFORMANCE; DETERMINANTS; BUSY;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jbankfin.2012.07.017

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

This paper investigates the impact of family control and institutional investors on CEO pay packages in Continental Europe, using a dataset of 754 listed firms with 3731 firm-year observations from 14 countries during 2001-2008. We find that family control curbs the level of CEO total and cash compensation, and the fraction of equity-based compensation. Moreover, we do not observe a significant effect of family control on the excess level of total and cash compensation. This evidence indicates that controlling families do not use CEO compensation to expropriate wealth from minority shareholders. We show that institutional ownership is associated with higher levels of CEO cash and total compensation in Continental Europe, especially in family firms. Also, foreign institutional investors have a positive and significant impact on CEO compensation level. Finally, results indicate that institutional investors affect CEO pay structure: they increase the use of equity-based compensation in both family and non-family firms. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：3318 / 3335

页数：18

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