Does governance travel around the world? Evidence from institutional investors

被引:870
作者
Aggarwal, Reena [1 ]
Erel, Isil [2 ]
Ferreira, Miguel [3 ]
Matos, Pedro [4 ]
机构
[1] Georgetown Univ, McDonough Sch Business, Washington, DC 20057 USA
[2] Ohio State Univ, Columbus, OH 43210 USA
[3] Univ Nova Lisboa, Fac Econ, P-1200 Lisbon, Portugal
[4] Univ So Calif, Los Angeles, CA 90089 USA
关键词
Institutional investors; Corporate governance; Shareholder activism; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM; OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE; PROTECTION; MERGERS; COSTS; BIAS; LAW; US;
D O I
10.1016/j.jfineco.2010.10.018
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We examine whether institutional investors affect corporate governance by analyzing portfolio holdings of institutions in companies from 23 countries during the period 2003-2008. We find that firm-level governance is positively associated with international institutional investment. Changes in institutional ownership over time positively affect subsequent changes in firm-level governance, but the opposite is not true. Foreign institutions and institutions from countries with strong shareholder protection play a role in promoting governance improvements outside of the U.S. Institutional investors affect not only which corporate governance mechanisms are in place, but also outcomes. Firms with higher institutional ownership are more likely to terminate poorly performing Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) and exhibit improvements in valuation over time. Our results suggest that international portfolio investment by institutional investors promotes good corporate governance practices around the world. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:154 / 181
页数:28
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