Customer-Driven Misconduct: How Competition Corrupts Business Practices

被引:104
作者
Bennett, Victor Manuel [1 ]
Pierce, Lamar [2 ]
Snyder, Jason A. [3 ]
Toffel, Michael W. [4 ]
机构
[1] Univ So Calif, Marshall Sch Business, Los Angeles, CA 90089 USA
[2] Washington Univ, John M Olin Sch Business, St Louis, MO 63130 USA
[3] Univ Calif Los Angeles, Anderson Sch Management, Los Angeles, CA 90095 USA
[4] Harvard Univ, Harvard Business Sch, Boston, MA 02163 USA
关键词
environment; pollution; government; regulations; judicial; legal; crime prevention; organizational studies; strategy; microeconomics; market structure and pricing; PRODUCT QUALITY; MARKET-STRUCTURE; BEHAVIOR; ENVIRONMENTS; PERFORMANCE; INCENTIVES; REPUTATION; INNOVATION; CONSUMERS; PRICES;
D O I
10.1287/mnsc.1120.1680
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
Competition among firms yields many benefits but can also encourage firms to engage in corrupt or unethical activities. We argue that competition can lead organizations to provide services that customers demand but that violate government regulations, especially when price competition is restricted. Using 28 million vehicle emissions tests from more than 11,000 facilities, we show that increased competition is associated with greater inspection leniency, a service quality attribute that customers value but is illegal and socially costly. Firms with more competitors pass customer vehicles at higher rates and are more likely to lose customers whom they fail, suggesting that competition intensifies pressure on facilities to provide illegal leniency. We also show that, at least in markets in which pricing is restricted, firms use corrupt and unethical practices as an entry strategy.
引用
收藏
页码:1725 / 1742
页数:18
相关论文
共 88 条
  • [11] PRODUCT QUALITY AND MARKET SIZE
    Berry, Steven
    Waldfogel, Joel
    [J]. JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS, 2010, 58 (01) : 1 - 31
  • [12] Market share, market value and innovation in a panel of British manufacturing firms
    Blundell, R
    Griffith, R
    Van Reenen, J
    [J]. REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1999, 66 (03) : 529 - 554
  • [13] The Credit Ratings Game
    Bolton, Patrick
    Freixas, Xavier
    Shapiro, Joel
    [J]. JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 2012, 67 (01) : 85 - 111
  • [14] Branco F, 2012, WORKING PAPER
  • [15] ENTRY AND COMPETITION IN CONCENTRATED MARKETS
    BRESNAHAN, TF
    REISS, PC
    [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1991, 99 (05) : 977 - 1009
  • [16] Buell R, 2011, 11084 HBS
  • [17] COMPETITION AND CORPORATE TAX AVOIDANCE: EVIDENCE FROM CHINESE INDUSTRIAL FIRMS
    Cai, Hongbin
    Liu, Qiao
    [J]. ECONOMIC JOURNAL, 2009, 119 (537) : 764 - 795
  • [18] Traffic Congestion and Infant Health: Evidence from E-ZPass
    Currie, Janet
    Walker, Reed
    [J]. AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-APPLIED ECONOMICS, 2011, 3 (01) : 65 - 90
  • [19] Air pollution and infant health: Lessons from New Jersey
    Currie, Janet
    Neidell, Matthew
    Schmieder, Johannes F.
    [J]. JOURNAL OF HEALTH ECONOMICS, 2009, 28 (03) : 688 - 703
  • [20] Paying a Premium on Your Premium? Consolidation in the US Health Insurance Industry
    Dafny, Leemore
    Duggan, Mark
    Ramanarayanan, Subramaniam
    [J]. AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 2012, 102 (02) : 1161 - 1185