Competition among firms yields many benefits but can also encourage firms to engage in corrupt or unethical activities. We argue that competition can lead organizations to provide services that customers demand but that violate government regulations, especially when price competition is restricted. Using 28 million vehicle emissions tests from more than 11,000 facilities, we show that increased competition is associated with greater inspection leniency, a service quality attribute that customers value but is illegal and socially costly. Firms with more competitors pass customer vehicles at higher rates and are more likely to lose customers whom they fail, suggesting that competition intensifies pressure on facilities to provide illegal leniency. We also show that, at least in markets in which pricing is restricted, firms use corrupt and unethical practices as an entry strategy.
机构:
Yale Univ, Dept Econ, New Haven, CT 06520 USA
NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138 USAYale Univ, Dept Econ, New Haven, CT 06520 USA
Berry, Steven
Waldfogel, Joel
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
Univ Penn, Wharton Sch, Dept Business & Publ Policy, Philadelphia, PA 19104 USAYale Univ, Dept Econ, New Haven, CT 06520 USA
机构:
Yale Univ, Dept Econ, New Haven, CT 06520 USA
NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138 USAYale Univ, Dept Econ, New Haven, CT 06520 USA
Berry, Steven
Waldfogel, Joel
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
Univ Penn, Wharton Sch, Dept Business & Publ Policy, Philadelphia, PA 19104 USAYale Univ, Dept Econ, New Haven, CT 06520 USA