Imperfect Competition in the Interbank Market for Liquidity as a Rationale for Central Banking

被引：102

作者：

Acharya, Viral V. ^{[1
,2
]}

Gromb, Denis ^{[3
]}

Yorulmazer, Tanju ^{[4
]}

机构：

[1] NYU, Dept Finance, Stern Sch Business, New York, NY 10012 USA

[2] Natl Bur Econ Res, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA

[3] INSEAD, F-77305 Fontainebleau, France

[4] Fed Reserve Bank New York, New York, NY 10045 USA

来源：

AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MACROECONOMICS | 2012年 / 4卷 / 02期

关键词：

PRIVATE; CRISES; EFFICIENCY; CONTAGION; RISK;

D O I：

10.1257/mac.4.2.184

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We study interbank lending and asset sales markets in which banks with surplus liquidity have market power vis-a-vis banks needing liquidity, frictions arise in lending due to moral hazard, and assets are bank-specific. Surplus banks ration lending and instead purchase assets from needy banks, an inefficiency more acute during financial crises. A central bank acting as a lender-of-last-resort can ameliorate this inefficiency provided it is prepared to extend potentially loss-making loans or is better informed than outside markets, as might be the case if it also performs a supervisory role. This rationale for central banking finds support in historical episodes. (JEL E58, G01, G21, G28, L13, N21)

引用

页码：184 / 217

页数：34