MORAL HAZARD AND DYNAMIC INSURANCE DATA

被引：75

作者：

Abbring, Jaap H. ^{[1
]}

Chiappori, Pierre-Andre ^{[2
]}

Pinquet, Jean ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Free Univ Amsterdam, NL-1081 HV Amsterdam, Netherlands

[2] Univ Chicago, Chicago, IL 60637 USA

[3] Univ Paris 10, F-92001 Nanterre, France

来源：

JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION | 2003年 / 1卷 / 04期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1162/154247603322493159

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper exploits dynamic features of insurance contracts in the empirical analysis of moral hazard. We first show that experience rating implies negative occurrence dependence under moral hazard: individual claim intensities decrease with the number of past claims. We then show that dynamic insurance data allow to distinguish this moral-hazard effect from dynamic selection on unobservables. We develop nonparametric tests and estimate a flexible parametric model. We find no evidence of moral hazard in French car insurance. Our analysis contributes to a recent literature based on static data that has problems distinguishing between moral hazard and selection and dealing with dynamic features of actual insurance contracts. Methodologically, this paper builds on and extends the literature on state dependence and heterogeneity in event-history data. (JEL: D82, G22, C41, C14)

引用

页码：767 / 820

页数：55