When will payoff maximization survive?: An indirect evolutionary analysis

被引:40
作者
Güth, W
Peleg, B
机构
[1] Max Planck Inst Res Econ Syst, Strateg Interact Grp, D-07745 Jena, Germany
[2] Hebrew Univ Jerusalem, Ctr Rat & Interact Decis Theory, IL-91904 Jerusalem, Israel
关键词
(indirect) evolution; endogenous preferences; rationality; incomplete information;
D O I
10.1007/s191-001-8318-2
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Survival of payoff maximization is the usual as if-justification for assuming rational economic agents. An indirect evolutionary analysis allows for stimuli which are not directly related to reproductive success although they affect behavior. One first determines the solution for all possible constellations of stimuli, and then the evolutionarily stable stimuli. Our general analysis confirms the special results of former studies that payoff maximization in case of commonly known stimuli requires either that own success does not depend on other's behavior or that other's behavior is not influenced by own, stimuli. When stimuli are private information, one can derive similar necessary conditions.
引用
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页码:479 / 499
页数:21
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