Ownership and the Value of Political Connections: Evidence from China

被引:185
作者
Wu, Wenfeng [1 ]
Wu, Chongfeng [1 ]
Rui, Oliver M. [2 ]
机构
[1] Shanghai Jiao Tong Univ, Antai Coll Econ & Management, Shanghai 200052, Peoples R China
[2] Chinese Univ Hong Kong, Sch Accountancy, Shatin, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
关键词
political connection; ownership; firm value; corporate governance; China; G32; G34; G38; NEWLY PRIVATIZED FIRMS; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; TRANSITION ECONOMIES; FAMILY OWNERSHIP; PERFORMANCE; TURNOVER; INCENTIVES; FINANCE; EUROPE;
D O I
10.1111/j.1468-036X.2010.00547.x
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Research has found that political connectedness can have both positive and negative effects on firm value. To resolve these mixed findings, we investigate the impact of political ties conditional on ownership for a sample of Chinese firms over the period 19992006. We find that private firms with politically connected managers have a higher value and obtain more government subsidies than those without connected managers, whereas local state-owned enterprises with connected managers have a lower value and employ more surplus labour than those without connected managers. Our results indicate that the effect of political ties is subject to firm ownership.
引用
收藏
页码:695 / 729
页数:35
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