Norm enforcement in the city: A natural field experiment

被引:92
作者
Balafoutas, Loukas [2 ]
Nikiforakis, Nikos [1 ,3 ]
机构
[1] Max Planck Inst Res Collect Goods, D-53113 Bonn, Germany
[2] Univ Innsbruck, Dept Econ, A-6020 Innsbruck, Austria
[3] Univ Melbourne, Dept Econ, Melbourne, Vic 3010, Australia
关键词
Norm enforcement; Social norms; Field experiment; Altruistic punishment; Cooperation; ALTRUISTIC PUNISHMENT; WAITING LINES; SOCIAL NORMS; COOPERATION; RECIPROCITY; MECHANISM; BEHAVIOR; DEMAND; GAMES;
D O I
10.1016/j.euroecorev.2012.09.008
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Extensive evidence from laboratory experiments indicates that many individuals are willing to use costly punishment to enforce social norms, even in one-shot interactions. However, there appears to be little evidence in the literature of such behavior in the field. We study the propensity to punish norm violators in a natural field experiment conducted in the main subway station in Athens, Greece. The large number of passengers ensures that strategic motives for punishing are minimized. We study violations of two distinct efficiency-enhancing social norms. In line with laboratory evidence, we find that individuals punish norm violators. However, these individuals are a minority. Men are more likely than women to punish violators, while the decision to punish is unaffected by the violator's height and gender. Interestingly, we find that violations of the better known of the two norms are substantially less likely to trigger punishment. We present additional evidence from two surveys providing insights into the determinants of norm enforcement. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:1773 / 1785
页数:13
相关论文
共 39 条
[1]   Do non-strategic sanctions obey the law of demand? The demand for punishment in the voluntary contribution mechanism [J].
Anderson, CM ;
Putterman, L .
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 2006, 54 (01) :1-24
[2]  
[Anonymous], 2010, Der Spiegel
[3]  
[Anonymous], CORSINI ENCY PSYCHOL
[4]  
[Anonymous], 2008, Der Spiegel
[5]  
Cabral L., 2011, INTRINSIC INST UNPUB
[6]   The demand for punishment [J].
Carpenter, Jeffrey P. .
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION, 2007, 62 (04) :522-542
[7]   Weak reciprocity alone cannot explain peer punishment [J].
Casari, Marco .
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES, 2012, 35 (01) :21-22
[8]  
Chaudhuri A., 2012, EXPT EC, V14, P47
[9]  
Coleman James.S., 1994, Foundations of Social Theory
[10]   Punishment, counterpunishment and sanction enforcement in a social dilemma experiment [J].
Denant-Boemont, Laurent ;
Masclet, David ;
Noussair, Charles N. .
ECONOMIC THEORY, 2007, 33 (01) :145-167