Efficient signal proportional allocation (ESPA) mechanisms: Decentralized social welfare maximization for divisible resources

被引:37
作者
Maheswaran, R [1 ]
Basar, T
机构
[1] Univ So Calif, Informat Sci Inst, Marina Del Rey, CA 90292 USA
[2] Univ Illinois, Coordinated Sci Lab, Urbana, IL 61801 USA
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
communication system economics; game theory; mechanism design;
D O I
10.1109/JSAC.2006.872881
中图分类号
TM [电工技术]; TN [电子技术、通信技术];
学科分类号
0808 ; 0809 ;
摘要
We address the problem of devising efficient decentralized allocation mechanisms for a divisible resource, which is critical to many technological domains such as traffic management on the Internet and bandwidth allocation to agents in ad hoc wireless networks. We introduce a class of efficient signal proportional allocation (ESPA) mechanisms that yields an allocation which maximizes social welfare with minimal signaling and computational requirements for the resource. Revenue limits for this class are obtained and a sequence of schemes that approach these limits arbitrarily closely are given. We also present a locally stable negotiation scheme applicable to the entire class and illustrate efficiency and revenue properties through simulation.
引用
收藏
页码:1000 / 1009
页数:10
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