The nucleolus and kernel of veto-rich transferable utility games

被引:10
作者
Arin, J [1 ]
Feltkamp, V [1 ]
机构
[1] TILBURG UNIV,CTR & ECONOMETR DEPT,NL-5000 LE TILBURG,NETHERLANDS
关键词
D O I
10.1007/s001820050018
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The process of computing the nucleolus of arbitrary transferable utility games is notoriously hard. A number of papers have appeared in which the nucleolus is computed by an algorithm in which either one or a huge number of huge linear programs have to be solved. We show that on the class of veto-rich games, the nucleolus is the unique kernel element. Veto-rich games are games in which one of the players is needed by coalitions in order to obtain a non-zero payoff. We then provide a fast algorithm which does not use linear programming techniques to compute the nucleolus of these games. Furthermore, we provide a few examples of economic situations which belong to the class of veto-rich games and which are treated in the literature.
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页码:61 / 73
页数:13
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