Analysis of a static pricing scheme for priority services

被引：42

作者：

Marbach, P ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Toronto, Dept Comp Sci, Toronto, ON M5S 1A4, Canada

来源：

IEEE-ACM TRANSACTIONS ON NETWORKING | 2004年 / 12卷 / 02期

关键词：

congestion control; differentiated services; pricing; priority service;

D O I：

10.1109/TNET.2004.826275

中图分类号：

TP3 [计算技术、计算机技术];

学科分类号：

0812 ;

摘要：

We analyze a static pricing scheme for priority services. Users are free to choose the priority of their traffic but are charged accordingly. Using a game theoretic framework, we study the case where users choose priorities to maximize their net benefit. For the single link case, we show that there always exists an equilibrium for the corresponding game; however, the equilibrium is not necessarily unique. Furthermore, we show that packet loss in equilibrium can be expressed as a function of the prices associated with the, different priority classes. We provide a numerical case study to illustrate our results.

引用

页码：312 / 325

页数：14

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