During the Cold War, containment of Soviet power provided a north star to guide American foreign policy. Historically, however, the Cold War era was an anomalous period of consensus about the central concern of foreign policy (and even then it involved bitter disputes over Vietnam and Central America); more often, confusion has been the rule. For example, ethnic differences coloured appraisals of whether the United States should enter the First World War, and economic interests have always played an important role in the making of American foreign policy. (1) A careful study of American definitions of national interests in the 1890s, 1930s, and 1980s concludes that there is no single national interest. 'Analysts who assume that America has a discernible national interest whose defense should determine its relations with other nations are unable to explain the persistent failure to achieve domestic consensus on international objectives. (2) This was particularly true in the 1990s. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, no country could match or balance the United States. It had unsurpassed global military, economic, and cultural power. The Gulf War at the beginning of the decade was an easy victory; and at the end of the decade, America bombed Serbia without suffering a single casualty. The economy grew and the stock market boomed. The United States resembled Britain in its mid-Victorian glory, but with even greater global reach. But Americans were largely indifferent and uncertain about how to shape a foreign policy to guide this power. Polls showed the American public focused on domestic affairs and paying little attention to the rest of the world. Between 1989 and 2000, the television networks closed foreign bureaus and cut their foreign news content by two-thirds. Foreign affairs played little role in the 2000 presidential elections. And many of those Americans who did pay attention to foreign policy became arrogant about the country's power, arguing that it did not need to heed other nations.
