Bundling, Competition and Quality Investment: A Welfare Analysis

被引：19

作者：

Avenali, Alessandro ^{[1
]}

D'Annunzio, Anna ^{[1
,2
]}

Reverberi, Pierfrancesco ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Roma La Sapienza, Dipartimento Ingn Informat Automat & Gest Antonio, I-00185 Rome, Italy

[2] Toulouse Sch Econ, F-31000 Toulouse, France

来源：

REVIEW OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION | 2013年 / 43卷 / 03期

关键词：

Bundling; Quality investment; Vertical differentiation; Price discrimination; Price test; ANTITRUST; LOYALTY; GOODS;

D O I：

10.1007/s11151-013-9378-8

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We investigate how bundling affects investment in product quality, and derive welfare implications. A monopolist in a primary market competes with a rival in a complementary market. Bundling is the monopolist's preferred strategy, since it either extracts surplus from the rival's investment, or forces the rival to provide low quality. Bundling may reduce welfare without foreclosing the rival, but improves welfare when preventing undesirable investment. Since prohibiting bundling is not appropriate, we introduce a price test for bundled offers that preserves efficiencies from both bundling and quality investment, thereby improving welfare relative to the 'do-nothing' scenario. We consequently argue that this test should be applied whenever possible.

引用

页码：221 / 241

页数：21