Expected Utility Consistent Extensions of Preferences

被引:5
作者
Can, Burak [1 ]
Erdamar, Bora [1 ]
Sanver, M. Remzi [1 ]
机构
[1] Istanbul Bilgi Univ, Istanbul, Turkey
关键词
preferences over sets; expected utility consistency; strategy-proofness; SOCIAL CHOICE FUNCTIONS; MANIPULATION; LOTTERIES; RULES;
D O I
10.1007/s11238-007-9066-y
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We consider the problem of extending a (complete) order over a set to its power set. The extension axioms we consider generate orderings over sets according to their expected utilities induced by some assignment of utilities over alternatives and probability distributions over sets. The model we propose gives a general and unified exposition of expected utility consistent extensions whilst it allows to emphasize various subtleties, the effects of which seem to be underestimated - particularly in the literature on strategy-proof social choice correspondences.
引用
收藏
页码:123 / 144
页数:22
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