Multi-valued strategy-proof social choice rules

被引:49
作者
Ching, S [1 ]
Zhou, L
机构
[1] City Univ Hong Kong, Dept Econ & Finance, Kowloon, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
[2] Arizona State Univ, Dept Econ, Tempe, AZ 85287 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1007/s003550100134
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
In this paper we introduce a new definition of strategy-proofness for multi-valued social choice correspondences. We prove two Gibbard-Satterthwaite type results for strategy-proof social choice correspondences. These results show that allowing multiple outcomes as social choices will not necessarily lead to an escape from the Gibbard-Satterthwaite impossibility theorem.
引用
收藏
页码:569 / 580
页数:12
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