机构:
City Univ Hong Kong, Dept Econ & Finance, Kowloon, Hong Kong, Peoples R ChinaCity Univ Hong Kong, Dept Econ & Finance, Kowloon, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
Ching, S
[1
]
Zhou, L
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机构:City Univ Hong Kong, Dept Econ & Finance, Kowloon, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
Zhou, L
机构:
[1] City Univ Hong Kong, Dept Econ & Finance, Kowloon, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
[2] Arizona State Univ, Dept Econ, Tempe, AZ 85287 USA
In this paper we introduce a new definition of strategy-proofness for multi-valued social choice correspondences. We prove two Gibbard-Satterthwaite type results for strategy-proof social choice correspondences. These results show that allowing multiple outcomes as social choices will not necessarily lead to an escape from the Gibbard-Satterthwaite impossibility theorem.