Competition among supply chains: Implications of full returns policy

被引:58
作者
Ai, Xingzheng [1 ]
Chen, Jing [2 ]
Zhao, Haixia [1 ]
Tang, Xiaowo [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Elect Sci & Technol China, Sch Management & Econ, Chengdu 610054, Sichuan, Peoples R China
[2] Univ Winnipeg, Fac Business & Econ, Winnipeg, MB R3B 2E9, Canada
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Chain-to-chain competition; Full-returns policy; Clearance pricing; Optimal pricing; Game theory; RETAIL COMPETITION; SALES; MODEL;
D O I
10.1016/j.ijpe.2012.04.018
中图分类号
T [工业技术];
学科分类号
08 ;
摘要
We examine decisions of retailers and manufacturers in two competing supply chains selling a substitutable product, with demand uncertainty, when manufacturers offer or do not offer full returns policies. We consider retailers' two pricing strategies, optimal pricing and clearance pricing, and we find that full returns policies have different implications in the presence of chain-to-chain competition as compared to the case of a monopoly supply chain. The conditions under which manufacturers and retailers prefer or not prefer full returns policies are identified. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:257 / 265
页数:9
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