Judgments of cause and blame: The effects of intentionality and foreseeability

被引:208
作者
Lagnado, David A. [1 ]
Channon, Shelley [1 ]
机构
[1] UCL, Dept Cognit Perceptual & Brain Sci, London WC1E 6BT, England
基金
英国经济与社会研究理事会;
关键词
Cause; Blame; Attribution; Intentionality; Foreseeability;
D O I
10.1016/j.cognition.2008.06.009
中图分类号
B84 [心理学];
学科分类号
04 ; 0402 ;
摘要
What are the factors that influence everyday attributions of cause and blame? The current studies focus on sequences of events that lead to adverse outcomes, and examine people's cause and blame ratings for key events in these sequences. Experiment I manipulated the intentional status of candidate causes and their location in a causal chain. Participants rated intentional actions as more causal, and more blameworthy, than unintentional actions or physical events. There was also an overall effect of location, with later events assigned higher ratings than earlier events. Experiment 2 manipulated both intentionality and foreseeability. The preference for intentional actions was replicated, and there was a strong influence of foreseeability: actions were rated as more causal and more blameworthy when they were highly foreseeable. These findings are interpreted within two prominent theories of blame, [Shaver, K. G. (1985). The attribution of blame: Causality, responsibility, and blameworthiness. New York: Springer-Verlag] and [Alicke, M. D. (2000). Culpable control and the psychology of blame. Psychological Bulletin, 126, 556-574]. Overall, it is argued that the data are more consistent with Alicke's model of culpable control. (C) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:754 / 770
页数:17
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