The timing of retirement - New evidence from Swiss female workers

被引:53
作者
Hanel, Barbara [1 ]
Riphahn, Regina T. [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Melbourne, Melbourne Inst Appl Econ & Social Res, Melbourne, Vic 3010, Australia
[2] Univ Erlangen Nurnberg, Dept Econ, D-90403 Nurnberg, Germany
关键词
Retirement insurance; Incentives; Social security; Labor force exit; Natural experiment; SOCIAL-SECURITY; FINANCIAL INCENTIVES; PENSION INCENTIVES; EMPLOYMENT; DECISIONS;
D O I
10.1016/j.labeco.2012.05.013
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We investigate the responsiveness of individual retirement decisions to changes in financial incentives. A reform increased women's normal retirement age (NRA) in two steps from age 62 to age 63 first and then to age 64. At the same time retirement at the previous NRA became possible at a benefit discount. Since the reform affected specific birth cohorts we can identify causal effects. We find strong and robust behavioral effects of changes in financial retirement incentives. A permanent reduction of retirement benefits by 3.4% induces a decline in the age-specific annual retirement probability by over 50%. The response to changes in financial retirement benefits varies with educational background: those with low education respond most strongly to an increase in the price of leisure. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
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页码:718 / 728
页数:11
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