Asymmetric information and strategic competition in estate agency

被引：5

作者：

Bishop, P ^{[1
]}

Megicks, P ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Plymouth, Plymouth Business Sch, Plymouth PL4 8AA, Devon, England

来源：

SERVICE INDUSTRIES JOURNAL | 2002年 / 22卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1080/714005074

中图分类号：

C93 [管理学];

学科分类号：

12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;

摘要：

Many service relationships are characterised by informational asymmetries with service providers having better information concerning service quality than purchasers. Under such circumstances, signals may develop to transmit information between buyers and sellers. The mix of signals will depend upon particular market, product and firm characteristics. An empirical investigation of the estate agency industry shows that contingent contracts, trust building activities and market segmentation may support high quality, high price strategies within the context of asymmetric information.

引用

页码：89 / 108

页数：20

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