Pro-social missions and worker motivation: An experimental study

被引:49
作者
Fehrler, Sebastian [1 ,2 ,3 ]
Kosfeld, Michael [3 ,4 ,5 ,6 ]
机构
[1] Univ Zurich, Dept Polit Sci, CH-8050 Zurich, Switzerland
[2] Univ Zurich, Ctr Comparat & Int Studies CIS, CH-8050 Zurich, Switzerland
[3] Inst Study Labor IZA, Bonn, Germany
[4] Goethe Univ Frankfurt, Dept Management & Microecon, D-60323 Frankfurt, Germany
[5] Ctr Econ Policy Res, Washington, DC USA
[6] Ctr Econ Studies CESifo, Munich, Germany
关键词
Motivation; Sorting; Labor; Effort; Organization; Non-monetary incentives; NGOs; PUBLIC-SECTOR; INCENTIVES; EMPLOYEES; COMPETITION;
D O I
10.1016/j.jebo.2014.01.010
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Do employees work harder if their job has the right mission? In a laboratory labor market experiment, we test whether subjects provide higher effort if they can choose the mission of their job. We observe that subjects do not provide higher effort than in a control treatment. Surprised by this finding, we run a second experiment in which subjects can choose whether they want to work on a job with their preferred mission or not. A subgroup of agents (roughly one third) is willing to do so even if this option is more costly than choosing the alternative job. Moreover, we find that these subjects provide substantially higher effort. These results suggest that some workers can be motivated by missions and that selection into missionoriented organizations is an important factor to explain empirical findings of lower wages and high motivation in these organizations. (c) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
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页码:99 / 110
页数:12
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