International coordination of trade and domestic policies

[1] EXTREMAL EQUILIBRIA OF OLIGOPOLISTIC SUPERGAMES [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1986, 39 (01) : 191 - 225

[2] ON THE THEORY OF INFINITELY REPEATED GAMES WITH DISCOUNTING [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1988, 56 (02) : 383 - 396

[3] An economic theory of GATT [J]. AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 1999, 89 (01) : 215 - 248

[4] BAGWELL K, 1990, AM ECON REV, V80, P779

[5] DOMESTIC DISTORTIONS, TARIFFS AND THE THEORY OF OPTIMUM SUBSIDY [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1963, 71 (01) : 44 - 50

[6] TARIFFS AND QUOTAS - RETALIATION AND NEGOTIATION WITH 2 INSTRUMENTS OF PROTECTION [J]. JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, 1989, 26 (1-2) : 179 - 188

[7] STRATEGIC INTERACTION AMONG NATIONS - NEGOTIABLE AND NONNEGOTIABLE TRADE BARRIERS [J]. CANADIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS-REVUE CANADIENNE D ECONOMIQUE, 1990, 23 (01): : 84 - 108

[8] Dam K. W., 1970, GATT LAW INT EC ORG

[9] DEARDORFF A, 1997, EC DIMENSIONS INT LA, P248

[10] Dixit A., 1987, ADV EC THEORY, P329, DOI DOI 10.1017/CCOL0521340446

[1] EXTREMAL EQUILIBRIA OF OLIGOPOLISTIC SUPERGAMES [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1986, 39 (01) : 191 - 225

[2] ON THE THEORY OF INFINITELY REPEATED GAMES WITH DISCOUNTING [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1988, 56 (02) : 383 - 396

[3] An economic theory of GATT [J]. AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 1999, 89 (01) : 215 - 248

[4] BAGWELL K, 1990, AM ECON REV, V80, P779

[5] DOMESTIC DISTORTIONS, TARIFFS AND THE THEORY OF OPTIMUM SUBSIDY [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1963, 71 (01) : 44 - 50

[6] TARIFFS AND QUOTAS - RETALIATION AND NEGOTIATION WITH 2 INSTRUMENTS OF PROTECTION [J]. JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, 1989, 26 (1-2) : 179 - 188

[7] STRATEGIC INTERACTION AMONG NATIONS - NEGOTIABLE AND NONNEGOTIABLE TRADE BARRIERS [J]. CANADIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS-REVUE CANADIENNE D ECONOMIQUE, 1990, 23 (01): : 84 - 108

[8] Dam K. W., 1970, GATT LAW INT EC ORG

[9] DEARDORFF A, 1997, EC DIMENSIONS INT LA, P248

[10] Dixit A., 1987, ADV EC THEORY, P329, DOI DOI 10.1017/CCOL0521340446