Small- and large-stakes risk aversion: Implications of concavity calibration for decision theory

被引:61
作者
Cox, James C.
Sadiraj, Vjollca
机构
[1] Univ Arizona, Dept Econ, Tucson, AZ 85721 USA
[2] Indiana Univ, Workshop Polit Theory & Policy Anal, Bloomington, IN 47408 USA
[3] Univ Arizona, Econ Sci Lab, Tucson, AZ 85721 USA
[4] Univ Amsterdam, CREED, NL-1019 WB Amsterdam, Netherlands
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
concavity calibration; expected utility theory; prospect theory; risk aversion;
D O I
10.1016/j.geb.2005.08.001
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
A growing literature reports the conclusions that: (a) expected utility theory does not provide a plausible theory of risk aversion for both small-stakes and large-stakes gambles; and (b) this decision theory should be replaced with an alternative theory characterized by loss aversion. This paper explains that the arguments in previous literature fail to support these conclusions. Either concavity calibration has no general implication for expected utility theory or it has problematic implications for all decision theories that involve concave transformations (utility of value functions) of positive money payoffs, which makes loss aversion irrelevant to the argument. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:45 / 60
页数:16
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