Bidding behavior in competing auctions: Evidence from eBay

被引:67
作者
Anwar, S
McMillan, R
Zheng, ML [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Macau, Fac Social Sci & Humanities, Taipa, Peoples R China
[2] James Cook Univ, Sch Business, Cairns, Qld 4870, Australia
[3] Univ Adelaide, IGSM, Adelaide, SA 5000, Australia
[4] Univ Toronto, Dept Econ, Toronto, ON M5G 3G7, Canada
关键词
competing auction; cross-bidding; auction empirics;
D O I
10.1016/j.euroecorev.2004.10.007
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Much of the existing auction literature treats auctions as running independently of one another, with each bidder choosing to participate in only one auction. However, in many online auctions, a number of substitutable goods are auctioned concurrently and bidders can bid on several auctions at the same time. Recent theoretical research shows how bidders can gain from the existence of competing auctions, the current paper providing the first empirical evidence in support of competing auctions theory using online auctions data from eBay. Our results indicate that a significant proportion of bidders do bid across competing auctions and that bidders tend to submit bids on auctions with the lowest standing bid, as the theory predicts. The paper also shows that winning bidders who cross-bid pay lower prices on average than winning bidders who do not. (c) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:307 / 322
页数:16
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