Corporate tax effects on the quality and quantity of FDI

被引:52
作者
Becker, Johannes [2 ]
Fuest, Clemens [1 ]
Riedel, Nadine [3 ,4 ]
机构
[1] Univ Oxford, Said Business Sch, Ctr Business Taxat, Oxford OX1 HP, England
[2] Univ Munster, Inst Publ Econ 1, D-48143 Munster, Germany
[3] Univ Oxford, Univ Hohenheim, Ctr Business Taxat, Inst Econ, Oxford OX1 HP, England
[4] CESifo Munich, Munich, Germany
关键词
Corporate taxation; Foreign direct investment; Multinational firms; FOREIGN OWNERSHIP; MULTINATIONALS; TAXATION; FIRMS;
D O I
10.1016/j.euroecorev.2012.07.001
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper measures the relative importance of quality and quantity effects of corporate taxation on foreign direct investment. Quantity is affected if corporate taxes reduce the equilibrium stock of foreign capital in a given country. Quality effects arise if taxes decrease the extent to which investment contributes to the corporate tax base and the capital intensity of production. Depending on the sign of the quality effects, the detrimental welfare effects of corporate taxation are either mitigated or aggravated. We derive a number of hypotheses about how corporate tax changes may affect the quality of investment. Our hypotheses are then tested using data from a large sample of European multinationals. With regard to corporate tax effects on the corporate tax base, we find that quality effects account for up to 40% of the total effect. With regard to corporate tax effects on labour income, our results suggest that quality effects mitigate the negative quantity effect by nearly 60% (as corporate taxes strongly increase the labour intensity of production). An important implication is that governments should not exclusively care about the size of inbound FDI flows but also about their specific characteristics, i.e. their quality. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:1495 / 1511
页数:17
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