Destructive Competition: Factionalism and Rent-Seeking in Iran

被引：27

作者：

Bjorvatn, Kjetil ^{[1
]}

Selvik, Kjetil ^{[2
,3
]}

机构：

[1] Norwegian Sch Econ & Business Adm, N-5035 Bergen, Norway

[2] Univ Oslo, Oslo, Norway

[3] Fafo AIS, Oslo, Norway

来源：

WORLD DEVELOPMENT | 2008年 / 36卷 / 11期

关键词：

Iran; rent-seeking; oil revenues; institutions; factionalism; resource curse; Middle East;

D O I：

10.1016/j.worlddev.2007.11.002

中图分类号：

F0 [经济学]; F1 [世界各国经济概况、经济史、经济地理]; C [社会科学总论];

学科分类号：

0201 ; 020105 ; 03 ; 0303 ;

摘要：

The literature on the '"resource curse" Suggests that the quality of institutions determines a country's ability to transform resource wealth into economic development. This article explores the link between resource rents. institutions, and economic performance by focusing on the case of Iran. A key feature of Iran's institutional environment is its factionalized political system. We give an introduction to the main actors vying for control over the country's resources and analyze the effect of their destructive competition. Using it theoretical model. we study how Oil revenues and the relative strength of interest groups affect private investment and economic efficiency. (C) 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：2314 / 2324

页数：11

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