How collateral laws shape lending and sectoral activity

被引:77
作者
Calomiris, Charles W. [1 ,2 ]
Larrain, Mauricio [1 ,3 ]
Liberti, Jose [4 ,5 ]
Sturgess, Jason [4 ]
机构
[1] Columbia Business Sch, 3022 Broadway,Uris Hall, New York, NY 10027 USA
[2] Natl Bur Econ Res, 1050 Massachusetts Ave, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[3] Pontificia Univ Catolica Chile Sch Management, Avda Vicuna Mackenna 4860, Santiago, Chile
[4] Depaul Univ, Driehaus Coll Business, 1 E Jackson Blvd, Chicago, IL 60604 USA
[5] Northwestern Univ, Kellogg Sch Management, 2001 Sheridan Rd, Evanston, IL 60208 USA
关键词
Movable collateral; Immovable collateral; Collateral laws; Creditor rights; Loan-to-value ratios; FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT; LIQUIDATION VALUES; DEBT CAPACITY; MORAL HAZARD; CREDIT; GROWTH; ENFORCEMENT; MARKETS; ALLOCATION; DEPENDENCE;
D O I
10.1016/j.jfineco.2016.09.005
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
020219 [财政学(含:税收学)];
摘要
We demonstrate the central importance of creditors' ability to use movable assets as collateral (as distinct from immovable real estate) when borrowing from banks. Using a unique cross-country micro-level loan data set containing loan-to-value ratios for different assets, we find that loan-to-values of loans collateralized with movable assets are lower in countries with weak collateral laws, relative to immovable assets, and that lending is biased toward the use of immovable assets. Using sector-level data, we find that weak movable collateral laws create distortions in the allocation of resources that favor immovable-based production and investment. An analysis of Slovakia's collateral law reform confirms our findings. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:163 / 188
页数:26
相关论文
共 70 条
[1]
Creditor Rights, Enforcement, and Bank Loans [J].
Bae, Kee-Hong ;
Goyal, Vidhan K. .
JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 2009, 64 (02) :823-860
[2]
Financing patterns around the world: Are small firms different? [J].
Beck, Thorsten ;
Demirguec-Kunt, Asli ;
Maksimovic, Vojislav .
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 2008, 89 (03) :467-487
[3]
Benmelech E, 2005, Q J ECON, V120, P1121, DOI 10.1093/qje/120.3.1121
[4]
Bankruptcy and the Collateral Channel [J].
Benmelech, Efraim ;
Bergman, Nittai K. .
JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 2011, 66 (02) :337-378
[5]
Collateral pricing [J].
Benmelech, Efraim ;
Bergman, Nittai K. .
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 2009, 91 (03) :339-360
[6]
Asset Salability and Debt Maturity: Evidence from Nineteenth-Century American Railroads [J].
Benmelech, Efraim .
REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES, 2009, 22 (04) :1545-1584
[7]
Does it pay to have friends? Social ties and executive appointments in banking [J].
Berger, Allen N. ;
Kick, Thomas ;
Koetter, Michael ;
Schaeck, Klaus .
JOURNAL OF BANKING & FINANCE, 2013, 37 (06) :2087-2105
[8]
Tests of ex ante versus ex post theories of collateral using private and public information [J].
Berger, Allen N. ;
Frame, W. Scott ;
Ioannidou, Vasso .
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 2011, 100 (01) :85-97
[9]
COLLATERAL, LOAN QUALITY, AND BANK RISK [J].
BERGER, AN ;
UDELL, GF .
JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS, 1990, 25 (01) :21-42
[10]
BESTER H, 1985, AM ECON REV, V75, P850