A simple random assignment problem with a unique solution

被引：50

作者：

Bogomoinaia, A

Moulin, H

机构：

[1] Rice Univ, Dept Econ, Houston, TX 77251 USA

[2] So Methodist Univ, Dept Econ, Dallas, TX 75275 USA

来源：

ECONOMIC THEORY | 2002年 / 19卷 / 03期

关键词：

random assignment; no envy; strategy proofness; priority;

D O I：

10.1007/s001990100168

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

All agents have the same ordinal ranking over all objects, receiving no object (opting out) may be preferable to some objects, agents differ on which objects are worse than opting out, and the latter information is private. The Probabilistic Serial assignment, improves upon (in the Pareto sense) the Random Priority assignment, that randomly orders the agents and offers them successively the most valuable remaining object. We characterize Probabilistic Serial by efficiency in an ordinal sense, and envy-freeness. We characterize it also by ordinal efficiency, strategyproofness and equal treatment of equals.

引用

页码：623 / 635

页数：13