The Lure of Authority: Motivation and Incentive Effects of Power

被引：152

作者：

Fehr, Ernst ^{[1
]}

Herz, Holger ^{[1
]}

Wilkening, Tom ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Zurich, Dept Econ, CH-8006 Zurich, Switzerland

[2] Univ Melbourne, Dept Econ, Melbourne, Vic 3010, Australia

来源：

AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW | 2013年 / 103卷 / 04期

关键词：

HIDDEN COSTS; DELEGATION; ADVANTAGE; EXCHANGE; BENEFITS; REGRET; RIGHTS;

D O I：

10.1257/aer.103.4.1325

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Authority and power permeate political, social, and economic life, but empirical knowledge about the motivational origins and consequences of authority is limited. We study the motivation and incentive effects of authority experimentally in an authority-delegation game. Individuals often retain authority even when its delegation is in their material interest-suggesting that authority has nonpecuniary consequences for utility. Authority also leads to over-provision of effort by the controlling parties, while a large percentage of subordinates underprovide effort despite pecuniary incentives to the contrary. Authority thus has important motivational consequences that exacerbate the inefficiencies arising from suboptimal delegation choices. (JEL C92, D23, D82)

引用

页码：1325 / 1359

页数：35