Experience from a course in game theory: Pre- and postclass problem sets as a didactic device

被引:27
作者
Rubinstein, A [1 ]
机构
[1] Tel Aviv Univ, Sch Econ, IL-69978 Tel Aviv, Israel
[2] Princeton Univ, Dept Econ, Princeton, NJ 08544 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1006/game.1999.0723
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The paper summarizes my experience in teaching an undergraduate course in game theory in 1998. Students were required to submit two types of problem sets: preclass problem sets, which served as experiments, and postclass standard problem sets. The separation emphasizes the limited relevance of game theory as a toot for making predictions and giving advice. The paper summarizes the results of 41 experiments which were conducted during the course. It is argued that the crude experimental methods produced results which are not substantially different from those obtained using stricter experimental methods. For further information on the 41 experiments and results, see http://www.princeton.edu/similar to ariel/99/gt100.html. (C) 1999 Academic Press.
引用
收藏
页码:155 / 170
页数:16
相关论文
共 32 条
[1]  
[Anonymous], 1995, MATH MAG, DOI DOI 10.1080/0025570X.1995.11996270
[2]  
AYTON P, 1995, 15 BIANN C SUBJ PROB, P37
[3]   DO PEOPLE RELY ON THE SELF-INTERESTED MAXIMIZATION OF OTHERS - AN EXPERIMENTAL TEST [J].
BEARD, TR ;
BEIL, RO .
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, 1994, 40 (02) :252-262
[4]   SIGNALING FUTURE ACTIONS AND THE POTENTIAL FOR SACRIFICE [J].
BENPORATH, E ;
DEKEL, E .
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1992, 57 (01) :36-51
[5]   Progress in behavioral game theory [J].
Camerer, CF .
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES, 1997, 11 (04) :167-188
[6]  
CAMERER CF, 1993, FRONTIERS OF GAME THEORY, P27
[7]  
COOPER R, 1993, AM ECON REV, V83, P1303
[8]  
COOPER R, 1980, EXPT NONCOOPERATIVE, P129
[9]  
ECKEL C, 1989, AM ECON REV, V79, P763
[10]   FAIRNESS IN SIMPLE BARGAINING EXPERIMENTS [J].
FORSYTHE, R ;
HOROWITZ, JL ;
SAVIN, NE ;
SEFTON, M .
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 1994, 6 (03) :347-369