DO LAB EXPERIMENTS MISREPRESENT SOCIAL PREFERENCES? THE CASE OF SELF-SELECTED STUDENT SAMPLES

被引:143
作者
Falk, Armin [1 ]
Meier, Stephan [2 ]
Zehnder, Christian [3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Bonn, Bonn, Germany
[2] Columbia Univ, New York, NY 10027 USA
[3] Univ Lausanne, CH-1015 Lausanne, Switzerland
关键词
TRUST; FIELD; COOPERATION; RECIPROCITY; BEHAVIOR; PEOPLE;
D O I
10.1111/jeea.12019
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Social preference research has received considerable attention among economists in recent years. However, the empirical foundation of social preferences is largely based on laboratory experiments with self-selected students as participants. This is potentially problematic as students participating in experiments may behave systematically different than nonparticipating students or nonstudents. In this paper we empirically investigate whether laboratory experiments with student samples misrepresent the importance of social preferences. Our first study shows that students who exhibit stronger prosocial inclinations in an unrelated field donation are not more likely to participate in experiments. This suggests that self-selection of more prosocial students into experiments is not a major issue. Our second study compares the behavior of students and participants recruited from the general population in a trust experiment. In general, we find very similar behavioral patterns for the two groups, but nonstudents make significantly more generous repayments suggesting that results from student samples might be seen as a lower bound for the importance of prosocial behavior.
引用
收藏
页码:839 / 852
页数:14
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