Measuring players' losses in experimental games

被引:17
作者
Fudenberg, D [1 ]
Levine, DK [1 ]
机构
[1] UNIV CALIF LOS ANGELES,DEPT ECON,LOS ANGELES,CA 90024
关键词
D O I
10.1162/003355397555271
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
In some experiments rational players who understand the structure of the game could improve their payoff. We bound the size of the observed losses in several such experiments. To do this, we suppose that observed play resembles an equilibrium because players learn about their opponents' play. Consequently, in an extensive-form game, some actions that are not optimal given the true distribution of opponents' play could be optimal given available information. We find that average losses are small: $0.03 to $0.64 per player with stakes between $2 and $30. In one of the three experiments we examine, this also implies a narrow range of outcome.
引用
收藏
页码:507 / 536
页数:30
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